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Abstract
Some two million Americans are currently incarcerated, with roughly six
hundred thousand to be released this year. Despite this, little is known about
the eﬀects of conﬁnement on the post-release lives of inmates. Focusing on post-
release criminal activity, we identify the eﬀect of prison conditions on recidivism
rates by exploiting a discontinuity in the assignment of federal prisoners to
security levels. We ﬁnd that worsening prison conditions signiﬁcantly increases
post-release crime, and that this increase is skewed towards the commission of
violent crimes.
There are similar punishments and crimes called by the same name,
but there are no two beings equal in regard to their morals; and every time
that convicts are put together, there exists necessarily a fatal inﬂuence of
some upon others, because, in the association of the wicked, it is not the
less guilty who act upon the more criminal, but the more depraved who
inﬂuence those who are less so.
Gustave de Beaumont and Alexis de Tocqueville, 1833
America’s jails and prisons house roughly two million inmates (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002), nearly twice as many as in 1990 and more (in per capita terms) than
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1any other OECD country (OECD, 2001). Current and former prisoners constitute an
increasingly large share of the U.S. population, yet little is known about the eﬀects
that imprisonment has on the lives of inmates.1 This omission is unfortunate: each
year roughly six hundred thousand are released from incarceration (Bureau of Justice
Statistics, 2002), and an estimated two-thirds of those released will be rearrested
within three years (Langan and Levin, 2002 ). This alone means that former inmates
account for a signiﬁcant share of crime. Moreover, unlike most determinants of crime
such as the state of the economy, prison conditions are under the direct control of
the criminal justice system. Understanding the eﬀect of conditions of conﬁnement on
post-release criminal activity is therefore essential to good crime-control policy.2
Theory alone cannot tell us whether an increase in the severity of prison con-
ditions will increase or decrease the propensity of inmates to commit crimes after
release. Models of “speciﬁc deterrence” (Smith and Gartin, 1989), which posit that
criminals learn from their own experiences about the severity of penalties, predict
that harsher conditions will decrease the propensity to recidivate. If harsh conditions
in the present incarceration signal harsh conditions in future incarcerations (for ex-
ample because of an inmate classiﬁcation system), deterrence will tend to decrease
future criminal activity. Alternatively, if harsher prison conditions correspond to in-
ferior labor market outcomes (as suggested by Western, Kling, and Weiman, 2001) or
if prison life induces a taste for violence (Banister, Smith, Heskin and Bolston, 1973
), then harsher conditions may lead to more crime following release. More generally,
1Research on prison has instead focused on its deterrence and incapacitation eﬀects, largely
ignoring the eﬀects of prison conditions on inmates’ post-release outcomes. See, for example, Levitt
(1996) and Kessler and Levitt (1999). Katz, Levitt, and Shustorovich (forthcoming) estimate the
deterrence eﬀects of harsher prison conditions.
2For example, the literature on prison privatization has recently focused much of its attention
on whether private prisons are likely to provide lower quality services than publicly managed pris-
ons (Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997; Camp and Gaes, 2001). If prison conditions aﬀect rates of
post-release crime commission, then providing quality-based incentives to private prison managers
becomes an even higher priority.
2a growing literature on social interactions highlights the inﬂuence of peer eﬀects on
behavior (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996). During incarceration, inmates
may acquire skills, learn of new prospects, or develop criminal contacts.
In this paper we exploit a feature of the federal inmate classiﬁcation system to
estimate the eﬀect of moving a prisoner to a higher security level. Each federal inmate
is assigned a score which is intended to reﬂect his need for supervision. Which security
level an inmate is classiﬁed under depends on where his score falls relative to certain
predetermined cutoﬀ values. By comparing inmates just at the boundaries between
diﬀerent security levels, we can estimate the eﬀect on recidivism of being assigned
to a higher security level. Since conditions of conﬁnement vary dramatically with
security level, this setting provides a quasi-experiment for identifying the eﬀect of
prison conditions on post-release outcomes.
We ﬁnd that moving a prisoner from minimum to low security increases his daily
hazard rate of rearrest following release by a factor of two, making him likely to be
rearrested 50% sooner. This eﬀect is not present in a control population of prison-
ers who are assigned scores but are not housed with the general prison population,
suggesting that our ﬁndings are indeed driven by the eﬀect of prison conditions on
inmates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses the relationship between
security level and conditions of conﬁnement and describes the dataset. Section 2
presents our ﬁndings as well as some tests of our identifying assumptions. Section 3
concludes.
31 Background and Data Description
1.1 Inmate Classiﬁcation and Security Level
Upon entry to the federal prison system, an inmate is processed using an Inmate
Load and Security Designation Form (see Figure 1).3 The Security Designation Data
recorded on the form are used to produce the individual’s security custody score.4
Each of seven items contributes points to an overall sum. For example, oﬀenses are
grouped into ﬁve categories, from lowest severity (such as traﬃc violations) to greatest
severity (such as homicide), and each inmate receives an associated oﬀense severity
score ranging from 0 (least severe) to 7 (most severe). Appendix Table 2a provides
further details.
Once the score has been computed, it is compared to a set of cutoﬀ values (see
Appendix Table 2b) to determine an inmate’s security level. Certain additional con-
siderations may intervene to prevent the inmate from being housed in what would
otherwise be his security level. For example, deportable aliens may not be housed in
minimum security, nor can those who have been convicted of threats to government
oﬃcials.5 In some cases security level can be changed at the discretion of a Bureau
of Prisons (BOP) oﬃcial, although such instances appear rare. Once a security level
has been assigned to an inmate a BOP employee assigns the inmate to a prison based
primarily on location and on the availability of space.6
3Throughout this section we rely on the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Security Designation and
Custody Classiﬁcation Manual (1985) for details about the procedure for classifying inmates. A
copy of the current manual is available at www.bop.gov/progstat/ser5000.html.
4The score is intended to predict prisoner misconduct and therefore to measure the supervision
needs of individuals. Over time, the score has been reﬁned through continuing research into the
predictors of prisoner misconduct (Harer and Langan, 2001).
5Other such considerations include medical and mental health, aggressive sexual behavior, oﬀense
severity, organized crime, and gang membership.
6An inmate can change facilities or security levels during the course of his incarceration, due, for
example, to changes in health or to in-prison misconduct. As changes are endogenous, we will focus
on security level upon entry to the federal prison system.
4An inmate’s assigned security level has an enormous impact on his experiences
in prison. As Appendix Table 2a details, prisoners convicted of more severe oﬀenses,
prisoners with more serious prior records, and prisoners with histories of violence are
all, by design, more likely to be placed in more secure facilities. Thus comparing
prisoners in diﬀerent security levels one would ﬁnd that those housed in more secure
facilities are exposed to more violent individuals with more serious criminal histories.
Given the growing literature on peer eﬀects and the intensity of contact co-housed
prisoners experience, this alone would warrant large security-level eﬀects on post-
prison characteristics.
Unfortunately, very few anthropological studies compare facilities with diﬀerent
security levels.7 Fortunately, ample inmate survey data provides a reasonable account
of how life diﬀers across security levels. Suﬃcient for our purposes, the Survey of
Inmates of Federal Correctional Facilities (U.S. Department of Justice, 1991), contains
data on inmate demographics, criminal histories, experiences in prison, and self-
reported conditions of conﬁnement for a nationally representative sample of federal
inmates.8
Table 1 presents some simple comparisons across security levels, both in self-
reported conditions of conﬁnement and in-prison misconduct. The data strongly
conﬁrm the intuition that more secure facilities allow less contact with the community
and less freedom of movement. While 14% of minimum security inmates report having
been allowed furloughs during their current period of conﬁnement, only 2.5% of low
security inmates have had furloughs; for maximum security inmates the ﬁgure is
below 1%. Similar trends show up in the percent of respondents who have been
7Anthropological accounts of life in prison typically focus on one institution, usually maximum
security (Sykes, 1958; Conover, 2001).
8While using self-reported data to compare conditions across security levels does raise some
methodological issues, Camp (1999) has found that such surveys do contain information helpful in
making comparisons between facilities.
5seriously injured during conﬁnement. Moving from minimum to low security exposes
an additional 2.7% to serious injury; moving from low to medium or medium to
maximum increases the rate of injury by 1.2% and 1.8%, respectively. On the whole
then, the data strongly supports the view that conditions of imprisonment diﬀer
dramatically by security level. Higher security prisons involve less contact with the
outside world, allow less freedom, and subject inmates to far more violence.
1.2 Data
Our data are a representative sample of 1,205 inmates released from federal prisons in
the ﬁrst six months of 1987 (Harer, 1994). The inmates were followed for three years
after release, and information on all post-release arrests during the follow-up period
was recorded. Data on demographic characteristics and criminal histories were also
recorded, as were the inmates’ security custody scores and security levels on entry to
the system, when available.9
Of the original sample of 1,205 inmates, security level data are missing for 16, and
11 served short sentences in halfway houses that do not have a security designation.
Another 216 were placed in administrative facilities for special medical needs; we will
later use this sub-sample as a control group in our analysis. Finally, 12 inmates have
missing data on score, leaving a total sample of 950.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for this group. Most striking is the fact that
half of all of inmates were rearrested within three years of release, a level comparable
to most state-level studies of recidivism (Camp and Camp, 1997). Other sample
characteristics are less surprising: relative to the U.S. population, the sample contains
9In many cases—usually inmates who entered the system prior to the introduction of modern
computer records—data from the initial classiﬁcation form was not available. In these cases score and
security level were recorded from the earliest available reclassiﬁcation form. The components of the
score are unlikely to change during conﬁnement, and conditional on time of entry, we ﬁnd that our
conclusions are quite similar (and statistically indistinguishable) across the two groups.
6more males, fewer whites, fewer high school graduates, and more previously convicted
oﬀenders. Grouping by security level, Table 2 also demonstrates the large changes
in these characteristics across levels. For example, the percent of convicts rearrested
within 3 years is 38% in minimum security, but jumps to 55% for low security, and is
60% for all levels higher then low. In these level statistics the most dramatic changes
occur when leaving minimum security, leading us to suspect that our strongest results
will come oﬀ this break.
A crucial requirement for our analysis is that security level vary discontinuously
with score. As Figure 2 demonstrates, the data conﬁrm what policy implies: the
probability of being placed in low rather than minimum security jumps discretely
when the score passes the oﬃcial cutoﬀ of 6. Similar jumps are visible at each cutoﬀ
(see Appendix Table 1).
2 Results
Given how drastically prison conditions diﬀer between security levels, it is plausible
that the type of an inmate’s prison greatly aﬀects his post-prison outcomes. To test
this we exploit the fact that the assignment process outlined in Section 1 exhibits
discontinuities at several pre-determined cut-oﬀ points. Inmates who ﬁnd themselves
at opposite ends of any of these cut-oﬀs are likely to be ex-ante comparable in all un-
derlying attributes, providing us with a quasi-experimental way of testing the eﬀects
of security level. A brief discussion of this method and its identifying assumptions is
appropriate.10
10Regression discontinuity is not new to the study of crime. Berk and Rauma (1983) investigate
the eﬀects of transitional aid to prisoners on recidivism, exploiting a California policy which extends
unemployment insurance to prisoners who work a certain number of hours prior to release. Berk
and de Leeuw (1999) also study the California prison system, using a regression discontinuity design
to predict the eﬀects of various assignment procedures on in-prison misconduct. More recently, this
technique has been used to estimate the eﬀects of ﬁnancial aid on college enrollment (van der Klaauw
7In a regression-discontinuity design, subjects are assigned a treatment condition
b a s e do nak n o w na n dm e a s u r e da s s i g n m e n tscore. For federal inmates the security
designation score discussed in Section 1.1 serves this purpose. By conditioning our
analysis of recidivism on both an inmate’s score and the resulting security level, we
obtain unbiased estimates of the treatment eﬀect. If the assignment rule were followed
without exception we would have a “sharp” RD design. This design assumes that all
variables (over which ex-post recidivism diﬀers) vary continuously with the assignment
score, while the treatment jumps at the pre-determined cut-oﬀ. In essence then,
within a small interval around a cut-oﬀ the allocation of prisoners to diﬀerent security
levels amounts to a random assignment procedure. We further assume that while
recidivism varies continuously with score, assigning an inmate to a higher security
level results in an additive shift in log recidivism. In other words, assuming that
the two within-group conditional expectation functions are parallel gives us our ﬁrst
design:
ln(Y )=βX + λg(score)+α1S6 + α2S9 + α3S13 + ². (1)
Here Y is years till re-arrest, g(score) is a fourth order polynomial in the security
custody score, and Sn are dummies for score > n. X is a standard matrix of covariates
which predict recidivism; their addition reduces the error on our estimate of the
treatment eﬀect.
To illustrate the eﬀect of security level on recidivism, Figure 3 plots median time
to re-arrest against score. We focus here on the change between minimum and low
security as we have relatively more data at this location and, on the basis of Section
1, expect the largest eﬀect here.
2001), the eﬀect of incumbency on election results (Lee, 2001), and the eﬀects of class size on school
performance (Hoxby, 2000).
8As a preliminary visual test of our identifying assumptions, Figure 4 plots median
predicted time to re-arrest against score. The predicted value is formed from a regres-
sion of time to re-arrest on a rich set of covariates.11 This regression performs quite
well in predicting recidivism, with an R2 of 18%. As the ﬁgure shows, the predicted
value varies quite smoothly with score and displays no jump between the cutoﬀ values
of 6 and 7. Thus a preliminary examination suggests that our identifying assumptions
are indeed reasonable.
2.1 OLS Estimation
Estimating Equation (1), our ﬁrst set of regressions apply the sharp RD design to the
sub-sample of prisoners for whom the security custody score solely determined their
initial prison placement. As we noted in our data description, this comprises about
two-thirds of our sample. Recall that medical and other considerations can override
the score in determining ﬁnal placement. Our ﬁrst OLS regression on non-overridden
prisoners (Table 3, Column 1) suggests that moving from a minimum to low security
facility reduces an inmate’s expected time to recidivism by 73%. In Column 2 we
i n c l u d eo t h e re x - a n t eo b s e r v a b l ei n m a t ec h a racteristics such as sex, age, race, family
and educational status. This second regression (Table 3, Column 2) shows that the
move from minimum to low security is by far the main predictor of recidivism in the
data. Neither of the other two security level cutoﬀs included (moving from Low to
Low/Medium to Medium) proves signiﬁcant, due primarily to the paucity of the data
at those levels.
In the remaining columns of Table 3 we reintroduce those inmates whose security
designations were overridden. This biases downward our estimates on the treatment
eﬀect of a higher security level, since the pre-determined cut-oﬀs no longer solely
11Included in the regression are age and dummies for high school graduate, prior convictions,
married, white, male, and employed prior to arrest.
9determine the security level of an inmate. Estimating Equation (1) on the whole
sample, our coeﬃcient on moving from minimum to low security falls to 42%, but
remains signiﬁcant.
2.2 Hazard Model Estimation
Since the inmates in our sample were followed for only 3 years after release, our
measure of recidivism is right-censored. Also, as Kiefer (1988) notes, the distribu-
tional assumptions implied by OLS are typically inappropriate for analyzing duration
data of this kind. We therefore adopt the Cox proportional hazard model to provide
alternative estimates of the eﬀect of security level on recidivism.
In the Cox model, survival-time data is analyzed assuming that an underlying haz-
ard rate of failure is multiplicatively shifted by changes in right-hand-side variables.
In our study the underlying function is an inmate’s daily probability of re-arrest, with
the resulting survival time being the length of time a prisoner remains outside the
penal system. The Cox model estimates the form of this hazard function directly oﬀ
the data, and hence makes no functional form assumptions about the underlying pro-
cess which generates recidivism. This speciﬁcation also allows us to take advantage
of information about when a prisoner is rearrested. Here, individuals who are not
rearrested during the follow-up period are treated as censored observations and do
not bias our results.
In particular, the Cox model assumes that the hazard rate of rearrest h(t)is given
by
h(t)=h0(t)exp(βX + λg(score)+α1S6 + α2S9 + α3S13)( 2 )
where h0(t) is the baseline hazard function, X is a standard matrix of covariates,
g(score)i saf o u r t ho r d e rp o l y n o m i a li nt he security custody score, and Sn are dum-
10mies for score > n. The parameters αn capture the eﬀects of security level on the
hazard rate of rearrest. Again, the underlying assumption required to identify the
eﬀects of security level is that all omitted characteristics vary continuously with score.
Table 4 reports the results of several Cox designs. Following the logic of our
OLS analysis, column (1) reports a Cox regression run on only those inmates for
whom the security-designation score solely determined their security designations.
The coeﬃcient of 2.81 on S6 indicates that moving from minimum to low security
nearly triples the daily hazard rate of re-arrest. As column (2) reports, re-introducing
those inmates whose placements were overridden reduces this coeﬃcient to 2.01, a
doubling of the daily hazard rate.
Column (3) of Table 4 restricts attention to those inmates who served at least a
year of their sentences before being released. If the treatment eﬀe c tw ee s t i m a t ei sd u e
to harsher prison conditions, it seems natural that it would increase with exposure
time. Column (3) conﬁrms that prediction; the coeﬃcient on S6 rises from 2.01 to
2.63. To test whether the eﬀect is larger for inmates with longer stays we interact
incarceration time with our cut-oﬀ dummies and re-estimate the model on the full
sample. Column (4) reports these results, which suggest that each additional year
served roughly doubles the eﬀect of moving from minimum to low security.
One plausible explanation of increased recidivism is the acquisition of crime-
speciﬁc skills while incarcerated; higher security levels may have a greater range of
“teachers” available. This learning wouldt e n dt oi n c r e a s ea ni n m a t e ’ sw a g et oc r i m -
inal activity relative to their legal wage and lead to more post-release crime. This
hypothesis would also predict that inmates in higher security levels are more likely to
commit more proﬁtable, pecuniary crimes (such as burglary, larceny, and auto theft)
than inmates in lower security levels.
The data seem to reject this hypothesis. We estimate a probit model on inmates
re-arrested during the follow-up period, where the dependent variable is a dummy
11indicating the inmate was arrested for a nonpecuniary crime such as murder or as-
sault.12 Inmates placed in low security facilities are considerably more likely to com-
mit nonpecuniary crimes than inmates placed in minimum security, with a coeﬃcient
on Score>6o f0 .28,(0.13).13 It seems that more severe prisons create more violent
criminals, not more skilled ones. To the degree that violent crimes bear higher social
costs, this estimate suggests that harsher prison conditions induce not only increased,
but systematically worse crimes.
2.3 Robustness
The estimates we have presented are consistent under the maintained hypothesis that
all correlates of recidivism vary continuously with score. While it is not possible to test
all covariates, we can ask whether all observed covariates meet this criterion. Figure
4 presented some preliminary visual evidence that predictors of recidivism vary con-
tinuously with score. Table 5 tests this claim more formally, regressing demographic
characteristics as of entry to prison on dummies for score cutoﬀs and a fourth-order
polynomial in score. As columns (1) through (3) report, none of these characteristics
appears to have a discontinuity at the score cutoﬀs. Thus it seems unlikely that our
results are driven by a pre-existing discontinuity at the score cutoﬀs.
An alternative check on our assumptions is to examine a population with known
scores that is not housed in accordance with the security guidelines of those scores.
Inmates housed in “administrative” facilities, which are essentially prison hospitals,
constitute just such a population. They are housed apart from the general population
and are therefore not exposed to the variation in conditions of conﬁnement that we
discussed in Section 1. Our dataset contains 211 inmates with known scores who
12We categorize manslaughter, homicide, sexual assault, assault, property damage, and sex oﬀenses
as nonpecuniary.
13This eﬀect is robust to the inclusion of a fourth-order polynomial in score.
12were housed in administrative facilities. Overall these inmates exhibit similar rates
of recidivism to the general inmate population, and we ﬁnd that similar demographic
characteristics predict recidivism in both groups. As column (5) reports, there is
no evidence of a discontinuous relationship between score and recidivism for these
inmates. For example, moving an inmate housed in an administrative facility from
minimum to low security designation reduces his expected time to rearrest by less
than 1%.
A ﬁnal concern is that our estimates measure the post-prison arrest rate, not
necessarily the crime-commission rate. The claim that harsher prison conditions
increase the commission of crimes rests on the assumption that the probability of
arresting an ex-convict conditional on his having committed a crime does not depend
on his former security level. For example, if upon release a low security inmate
is subject to more frequent drug tests than his minimum security counterpart, our
results may be picking up an increased probability of re-arrest that has nothing to do
with increased criminal tendencies.
Although the parole system leaves a great deal of room for individual discretion,
most state parole agencies use standardized risk assessment tools to map inmates
into supervision levels (Jones et al, 1999). None of the instruments we examined take
account of an inmate’s former security level, nor look as if their cut-oﬀs coincide with
those in the security custody score. Furthermore, the variables these systems do take
into account relate primarily to providing the appropriate services (drug users receive
drug counselling) and limiting especially newsworthy crimes (former pedophiles are
monitored very closely). Finally, the eﬀect of security level on recidivism is visible even
if we exclude parole violations from our sample. Thus, while we cannot completely
rule out a bias, it seems likely that the coeﬃcients we obtain represent a true treatment
eﬀect of security level on recidivism and not just an increased chance of arrest.
133C o n c l u s i o n
With over two million inmates currently inc a r c e r a t e da n ds i xh u n d r e dt h o u s a n di n -
mates released per year, the demographic impact of American prisons can hardly be
understated. In this paper we have attempted to understand the impact that incar-
ceration has on inmates’ subsequent lives, focusing on perhaps the most serious and
socially costly consequence of that incarceration, recidivism into crime. Our ﬁndings
suggest that inmates respond to harsher prison conditions by recidivating much ear-
lier and into more violent crimes. By exploiting discontinuities in the assignment of
inmates to diﬀerent security levels, we isolate the component of this eﬀect that results
directly from diﬀering treatments, from the negative selection the assignment process
produces.
To the degree that as an institution, prisons exist to reduce crime (both through
deterrence and incapacitation) our estimates serve as counterpoint. The deterrence
eﬀect of harsher sentences has been widely studied, and the incapacitation of crimi-
nals clearly reduces the immediate commission of crimes. Our results suggest these
reductions may come at the cost of future crimes, crimes that may be systematically
diﬀerent from those that preceded incarceration.
Clearly further research is required to illuminate these eﬀects more fully. A richer
understanding of the ways inmates respond to both harsher conditions and exposure
to more violent peers would allow prison systems to reduce socially costly recidivism
by redesigning their assignment systems, both between and within prisons. Prison
sentences and conditions could, in principle, be tailored to minimize the social costs of
crime, taking into account both current crime deterrence and future crime recurrence.
With the volume of prisoners that move through the American system showing no
signs of decline, the potential for social gains through such an exercise are consider-
able.
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17Table 1: Security Level and Prison Conditions
Percent of Inmates Security Level
Minimum Low Medium Maximum
Receiving a furlough 14.20% 2.50% 1.60% 0.78%
In cell for > 8 hours per day 49.01 55.21 55.03 58.22
Seriously injured 16.54 19.21 20.45 22.19
Found guilty of prison rule violation for:
Possession of drugs 0.45 2.02 3.59 15.78
Possession of alcohol 0.11 0.47 2.63 9.53
Possession of a weapon 0.00 0.12 0.99 7.66
Assaulting an inmate 1.07 3.32 5.05 9.38
Assaulting a correction oﬃcer 0.00 0.36 1.04 5.94
Number of observations 1782 843 2315 640
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Department of Justice (1991).
18Table 2: Summary Statistics
Security level All Minimum Low >Low
Mean time to rearrest 2.37 2.53* 2.17 2.16
Percent of inmates who are:
Rearrested within 3 years 46.84 37.83* 54.55 60.23
High school graduates 55.79 64.64* 46.06 44.02
Previously convicted 68.74 58.37* 80.61 82.24
Married as of arrest 38.42 43.54 36.36 29.34
Employed before arrest 53.79 63.69* 44.85 39.38
White 71.26 76.43* 67.88 62.93
Male 92.21 86.12* 100.00 99.61
Number of observations 950 526 165 259
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: * denotes diﬀerence in means between minimum and low security statisti-
cally signiﬁcant at the 5% level
19Table 3: OLS Estimates
Dependent variable: log(years until rearrest)
( 1 )( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )
Sample Sharp Sharp All All
Score>6 -0.7327 -0.6278 -0.5237 -0.4275
(0.2531) (0.2490) (0.1850) (0.1807)
Score>9 -0.1485 -0.0689 -0.0543 0.0139
(0.2717) (0.2657) (0.2039) (0.1985)
Score>13 -0.0951 -0.0615 0.2746 0.3216
(0.4239) (0.4141) (0.3101) (0.3024)
Security custody score -0.2809 -0.1921 -0.3231 -0.2188
(0.0834) (0.0828) (0.0663) (0.0660)
Score2 0.0490 0.0365 0.0737 0.0581
(0.0266) (0.0261) (0.0204) (0.0200)
Score3 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0054 -0.0046
(0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0017) (0.0017)
Score4 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Constant 0.9328 0.4749 0.9414 0.4297
(0.0435) (0.1665) (0.0382) (0.1441)
Demographic NO YES NO YES
controls?
Observations 645 645 948 948
R2 0.1235 0.1760 0.1059 0.1611
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
Demographic controls include age and dummies for high school graduate, prior
convictions, married, white, male, and employed prior to arrest.
20Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard Model Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample Sharp All Served at least All
one year
Score>6 2.8143 2.0135 2.6268 0.9308
(1.2171)** (0.6721)** (1.1959)** (0.4531)
Score>9 1.4426 1.5859 3.2905 0.8435
(0.6301) (0.5327) (1.5425)** (0.3948)
Score>13 1.5411 1.0471 1.2333 1.4792
(1.1239) (0.5175) (0.7325) (1.1498)
(Score > 6) * time served 2.1698
(0.9582)*
(Score > 9) * time served 2.2245
(0.9609)*
(Score > 13) * time served 0.7755
(0.4592)
Security custody score 1.9512 1.9842 2.0766 1.8395
(0.3156)** (0.2619)** (0.3999)** (0.3171)**
Score2 0.8975 0.8816 0.867 0.9287
(0.0440)** (0.0337)** (0.0470)** (0.0497)
Score3 1.0051 1.0079 1.0085 1.0036
(0.0042) (0.0031)** (0.0043)** (0.0045)
Score4 0.9999 0.9998 0.9998 0.9999
(0.0001) (0.0001)** (0.0001) (0.0001)
Score * time served 1.0029
(0.1508)
Score2 * time served 0.9647
(0.0449)
Score3 * time served 1.003
(0.0037)
Score4 * time servd 0.9999
(0.0001)
Observations 645 948 497 948
21Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
*s i g n i ﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%
22Table 5: Tests of Identifying Assumptions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Sample All All All Administrative
Dependent Age on Years of Number of log(years
variable admission school priors until rearrest)
Score>6 -2.5809 0.3502 1.4528 -0.0070
(2.3293) (0.6233) (1.0522) (0.2877)
Score>9 -2.2707 0.7151 0.6099 -0.1454
(2.5675) (0.6879) (1.1598) (0.4516)
Score>13 -0.8485 2.1251 2.2773 -1.0345
(3.9050) (1.0366) (1.7640) (0.8267)
Score -2.6991 -0.3508 0.9223 0.0282
(0.8349) (0.2240) (0.3771) (0.1525)
Score2 0.6155 -0.0075 -0.1002 -0.0544
(0.2571) (0.0690) (0.1161) (0.0512)
Score3 -0.0418 0.0013 0.0052 0.0071
(0.0219) (0.0059) (0.0099) (0.0055)
Score4 0.0009 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002)
Constant 38.3821 12.3866 1.5300 0.9190
(0.4809) (0.1276) (0.2172) (0.0980)
Observations 948 924 948 211
R2 0.0294 0.1414 0.2365 0.1442
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
23Figure 1: Inmate Load and Security Designation Form















































































































27Appendix Table 1: Score and Security Level
Score Assigned Percent of inmates in security level:
level Minimum Low Low/Med Medium
0 1 78.35 6.33 2.43 4.87
1 63.04 17.39 6.52 8.70
2 77.78 17.78 0.00 4.44
3 64.29 25.00 1.79 5.36
4 58.23 21.52 10.13 5.06
5 57.45 27.66 0.00 10.64
6 47.73 36.36 6.82 4.55
7 2 3.13 56.25 25.00 9.38
8 10.00 65.00 25.00 0.00
9 9.09 63.64 18.18 6.06
10 3 3.85 26.92 53.85 15.38
11 11.76 5.88 70.59 5.88
12 3.23 3.23 61.29 29.03
13 0.00 18.18 18.18 54.55
14 4 0.00 0.00 0.00 70.00
15 0.00 0.00 10.00 80.00
16 0.00 0.00 12.50 62.50
17 0.00 0.00 14.29 42.86
18 0.00 0.00 22.22 44.44
19 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
20 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
21 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00
22 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00
TOTAL 55.37 17.37 10.21 10.21
Source: Authors’ calculations.
28Appendix Table 2a: Computing the Security Custody Score
Inmate characteristic Score Range
From To
Type of detainer 0 (None) 7 (Greatest)
(severity of outstanding charges)
Severity of current oﬀense 0 (Lowest) 7 (Greatest)
Expected length of incarceration 0 (0-12 Months) 5 (84+ Months)
Type of prior commitments 0 (None) 3 (Serious)
History of escapes or attempts 0 (None) 7 (Recent Escape)
History of violence 0 (None) 7 (Recent Serious)
Precommitment status -6 (Voluntary Surrender) 0 (None)
(bail, bond, etc. set in trial)
TOTAL 0 36
Appendix Table 2b: Determining the Appropriate Security Level
Score Range Assigned Security Description Example
Level
0-6 1 Minimum Danbury Camp
7-9 2 Low La Tuna
10-13 3 Low/Medium Otisville
14-22 4 Medium Petersburg
23-29 5 High Leavenworth
30-36 6 High Marion
Source: Federal Bureau of Prisons (1985).
29